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ABSTRACT

Security researchers agree that security control is a difficult to observe credence quality of online services that
Internet users cannot easily assess through research or experience. Yet there is evidence that users form
perceptions of security control that strongly determine how much trust they put in online services. This study
investigates whether users’ security control perceptions arise solely from their predispositions or whether online

service providers can influence them. The study also examines whether these seemingly undependable
perceptions of security control lead to trust or whether more traditional factors might offer a better explanation
of trust under security risks. To address these issues, this study proposes a new theory of security assurance that
integrates the frameworks of trust and quality signals. The results show that rather than being guided by
predispositions, users appear to mainly assess security control based on indirect cues controlled by service
providers. Importantly, Internet users do not treat the credence quality of security the same way they treat
qualities that can be understood through search and experience. Although returning users develop security
control perceptions and trust from the usual heuristics of ongoing relationships, they also continue to evaluate
market information about service providers like they do in new relationships. The proposed model offers a new
perspective of how users respond to the uncertain and technically challenging qualities prevalent in online
services.

INTRODUCTION
Research on online security focuses largely on how online service providers can implement technical solutions
and manage security-related processes to comply with security standards (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). Critical
assessments of security research, however, argue that greater emphasis should be placed on understanding
security from the perspective of users (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Siponen & Willison, 2007). This concern is
justified by surveys of online users. An ongoing longitudinal study of Internet commerce in 2007 found that
more than 86% of respondents were concerned about information privacy and other security risks of online
purchasing, and the level of these concerns has only increased in follow-up studies (Center for the Digital
Future, 2007, 2010). Another recent survey found that understanding and addressing Internet users’ concerns
about security would greatly increase the trust that users place in online services and would lead to increased
sales (Horrigan, 2008). Our study seeks to correct the imbalance in the security literature by addressing how to
reassure users about security control and thereby increase their trust of online service providers.
From the perspective of consumers, security control is a quality of services that ensures “freedom from danger,
risk, or doubt” (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985, pp. 47–48). Online interactions involve communication
and storage of information, and therefore online security control requires providers to safeguard information
given to them and protect information during communication (Madu & Madu, 2002). However, an increasing
body of evidence suggests that users can neither determine what security measures are deployed at online
services nor understand the implementation details of security control (Furnell & Karweni, 1999; Rifon, Larose,
& Choi, 2005; Larose & Rifon, 2006). Consequently, online security is best characterized as a credence quality: a
quality that is difficult to determine by search efforts prior to using a service or even from experience after
sustained use of a service (Darby & Karni, 1973).
Both the study and practice of security reassurance strategies are complicated by the credence quality nature of
online security control. We are unaware of any theoretically grounded research that explains which antecedent
factors promote perceived security control. Consequently, it is unclear which managerial actions can best
promote security assurance and trust. Although the information systems (IS) literature has identified factors that
promote trust for search and experience qualities (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Gefen, Karahanna,
& Straub, 2003), much less is known about what kinds of factors might help users determine credence qualities.
Furthermore, the means by which perceived security control leads to trust is also not well understood. Although
some researchers argue that trust arises from perceived security control (Suh & Han, 2003), others disregard
perceived security control and suggest that trust arises directly from cues that signal security practices to users
(Schlosser, White, & Lloyd, 2006; Tang, Hu, & Smith, 2008). Without any study to compare these alternate
views, there is a need to qualify whether perceived security control is an important factor in gaining trust and
how perceived security control compares to alternative theories on security reassurance.

In this study, we sought to address these major gaps in our understanding by developing a theory-based model
of the antecedents and consequences of perceived security control. We started by investigating which factors
influence users’ perceptions of security control and whether these antecedents can explain why perceived
security control should be a strong determinant of trust. We then compared the influence of perceived security
control on trust to other security-related factors commonly mentioned in literature. We empirically tested the
proposed model and compared it to alternate explanations using data collected from users of online retailing
services. Our results suggest new directions for research and practice that can begin to bridge the gap between
security compliance and security assurance.

SECURITY CONTROL
Implementing Security Control
Online services employ a variety of tools to comply with security standards and to implement the different
facets of security control. Some of these security tools, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and
encrypted transmissions, are highly technical and not always visible to users (Bhimani, 1996; Furnell & Karweni,
1999; Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, & Cavusoglu, 2009). Security is also implemented during interaction with users
by presenting username-password challenges, emailing proofs-of-purchase, providing privacy and security
policies, and deploying third-party certificates. This wide range of security tools and techniques are categorized
in various ways by different researchers and industry bodies (Bhimani, 1996; Furnell & Karweni, 1999; Belanger,
Hiller, & Smith, 2002; Suh & Han, 2003; Bart, Shankar, Sultan, & Urban, 2005).
Overall, the different security efforts and artifacts documented in the extant literature fall into five categories of
security control: authentication control, nonrepudiation control, privacy control, confidentiality control, and
data integrity control (Suh & Han, 2003). Authentication control refers to efforts to ensure that both parties of
an online transaction or communication are confident of the other party's identity. Nonrepudiation control
means ensuring that neither vendors nor the consumers can deny having participated in a transaction or
communication. Privacy protection control is the assurance that sensitive information collected from customers
by any means is not disclosed without permission. Confidentiality control refers to restricting access to
communicated data to the two parties involved in the transaction. Finally, data integrity control refers to
ensuring that data in transit or storage is not modified or deleted accidentally or without authorization.
The security tools and techniques employed by online service providers not only implement these different
types of security control, it is often argued that the very presence of security tools and artifacts is a structural
assurance that promotes trusting beliefs in users (Nöteberg, Christiaanse, & Wallage, 1999). However, empirical
studies find that security artifacts often have a weak or insignificant influence on trust and behavioral intentions
when compared to important antecedents of trust, such as brand reputation and Web site quality (Belanger et
al., 2002; Bart et al., 2005). Surveys of online security perceptions find that Internet users generally display a
surprising “lack of awareness or understanding of the security technologies that are available” (Furnell &
Karweni, 1999, p. 372). Furthermore, users often feel that they cannot fully understand security documentation
and therefore do not take the time to try and analyze such information (Larose & Rifon, 2006). Most alarmingly,
users often misconstrue the mere presence of security artifacts as an indication of strict privacy and security
practices (Rifon et al., 2005). These empirical findings suggest that security control is a highly technical quality
and that artifacts of security control are not generally interpretable by users. As a result, security artifacts
cannot be entirely relied upon to impart assurance to users or to make users trust online service providers.

Antecedents of Perceived Security Control
Despite the difficulty in objectively observing security control, Internet users do form strong perceptions of
security control that influence how much trust they put in providers (Suh & Han, 2003; Cheung & Lee, 2006). To

understand why security control perceptions might influence trust, we framed its potential antecedents
according to the major sources of online trust identified in the IS literature (Gefen et al., 2003; Kim & Benbasat,
2003). Using the trust framework allowed us to compare the antecedents of perceived security control to
common sources of trust in ongoing marketing relationships and thereby ask why perceived security control
might have a broad impact on trust.
We began by noting that trust of an online service is not based on purely objective assessments, but that it can
arise from up to five different sources: users’ inherent personality, knowledge based on users’ prior experiences,
institutional assurances from providers, calculative assurances from providers, and cognitive assurances from
third parties (Gefen et al., 2003; Kim & Benbasat, 2003). These five sources of information on trustworthiness
reflect both the predispositions of users and the assurances of providers. We surmised that if perceived security
control is a strong determinant of trust, it must capture the predispositions and assurances that lead to trust.
Our proposed model, summarized in Figure 1, shows how predispositions and assurances should lead to
perceived security control, which in turn should promote trusting beliefs.

Figure 1 Proposed model.
Note: Dashed lines indicate paths controlled for in the proposed model and tested in the alternative model.

Personal predispositions to security control

Three factors that should predispose users to perceive security control are information technology
innovativeness, Internet privacy concern, and familiarity with providers. As shown in Table 1, the first two of
these predispositions, innovativeness and privacy concern, correspond to personality-based sources of trust,
whereas familiarity relates to knowledge-based sources of trust.
Table 1. Categorized antecedents of perceived security control.
Source of
Trust
Predispositions Technological
Personality
innovativeness
Internet privacy concern
Familiarity with service
Knowledge
Security
Privacy and security policies Institutional
signals
Web site investments
Calculative
Reputation

Cognitive

Signal Type
n/a
n/a
Marketing-level signal: default-contingent
Marketing-level signal: defaultindependent
Firm-level signal

Personality-based trust refers to users’ automatic predisposition to trust others and believe in their good
intentions (Gefen et al., 2003). Technological innovativeness ties together many of the personality-based factors
found in the trust literature because users who are technologically innovative also tend to be more trusting of
online vendors and more willing to adopt unfamiliar IS (Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; McKnight, Choudhury, &
Kacmar, 2002). The novelty-seeking nature of innovative users leads them to search for information that will
help them make decisions in the presence of risk (Hirschman, 1980) and we believe this is one of the reasons
innovativeness creates trust. In this study, therefore, technological innovativeness allows us to identify users
who are predisposed to seek information regarding security control and then act trustingly in what others would
perceive to be a risky situation. We propose, then, that technological innovativeness should ameliorate users’
perceptions of security control.
•

H1a: Personal innovativeness positively influences perceived security control.

However, even technologically innovative users might harbor suspicions about security control if they are
predisposed to believe that there are great risks associated with personal information on the Internet. The
propensity to be generally concerned about threats to personal information in online contexts is called Internet
privacy concern (Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996; Sheehan & Hoy, 2000; Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004).
General concerns about Internet privacy are believed to influence how users perceive specific online situations
and scenarios (Malhotra et al., 2004). Because perceived security control is a measure of how users perceive
risk at specific online situations, it should be directly affected by Internet privacy concern. Moreover, Internet
privacy concern is negatively associated with trust and positively associated with risk (Malhotra et al., 2004).
Therefore, we propose that higher Internet privacy concern lowers users’ estimation of security control.
•

H1b: Internet privacy concern negatively influences perceived security control.

Although personality traits are an important source of trusting beliefs, users can also be predisposed to trust
providers based on their prior knowledge of those providers. Knowledge-based trust arises when users’
familiarity with providers reduces the uncertainty of situations (Gefen et al., 2003). We believe that one reason
familiarity is related to trust in service providers is that familiarity increases the perception of security control:
As users gain familiarity with an online vendor, they acquire greater knowledge of security policies and securityrelated development efforts. Familiarity also reduces concern about opportunistic behaviors by providers
(Gulati, 1995). We propose, therefore, that increased familiarity will lead to higher perceptions of security
control.
•

H1c: Familiarity with a provider's Web site positively influences perceived security control.

Signals of security control

The perceived quality of security control should also be heavily determined by the active efforts of online service
providers. Service providers can increase the trust that users have in their online services by providing
institutional, calculative, and cognitive assurances (Gefen et al., 2003). However, such assurances may not
directly affect the perceptions of users because the quality of security is difficult for users to observe. Qualities
that cannot easily be determined prior to use or even with experience are properly thought of as a credence
qualities (Darby & Karni, 1973). Consumers must rely on indirect cues, or signals, to guess the level of credence
qualities (Zeithaml, 1988).
Signaling theory suggests that providers can perform actions and provide cues that convey information about
quality to customers if these signals are interpretable and credible (Duncan & Moriarty, 1998; Rao, Qu, &
Ruekert, 1999). For consumers, such signals serve as heuristics when quality attributes are too difficult to assess
(Dawar & Parker, 1994). Signals often found in marketing research, such as pricing, warranties, physical
appearance, advertising, and firm reputation, can suggest qualities such as reliability, durability, and security

(Parasuraman et al., 1985; Dawar & Parker, 1994). Signals can inform users of quality characteristics at the level
of a specific service or for a provider as a whole. However, signals of claimed quality are only credible if they are
tied to penalties for defaulting on such claims, where the penalties can be contingent upon or independent of
defaulting (Duncan & Moriarty, 1998).
We considered three major security signals from online service providers that could influence perceived security
control: privacy and security policies, perceived Web site investment, and the reputation of providers. Table
1 displays how each of our security signals corresponds to different types of signals and different sources of
trust. These signals are representative of the different levels of signaling and the different types of credibility
mentioned in signaling theory research. These signals are also broad in nature and encompass the many smaller
artifacts and efforts believed to influence security perceptions in prior research (Miyazaki & Fernandez,
2000; Rifon et al., 2005). Furthermore, the three security signals correspond respectively to the institutional,
calculative, and cognitive assurances that lead to trust.
Privacy and security policies are usually available to users in the form of policy documents or seals on many
commercial Web sites (Rifon et al., 2005). Providing policy documentation leads to trust from users (Rifon et al.,
2005; Schlosser et al., 2006; Wakefield & Whitten, 2006). Policy documentation should be a source of
institutional trust because users gain a “sense of security from guarantees, safety nets, or other impersonal
structures” (Gefen et al., 2003, p. 64). However, studies find that users rarely understand the actual policies
contained in online policy instruments and often misconstrue the presence of these artifacts as a sign of high
security standards (Miyazaki & Krishnamurthy, 2002). As a result, it appears that the main role of privacy and
security policies is to act as a signal of fair practice. Specifically, privacy and policy statements would act as
default-contingent signals that do not require large upfront costs to deploy, but instead make providers liable
for damages if perceived claims are breached (Duncan & Moriarty, 1998). We hypothesize, therefore, that
policy documents are primarily signals of higher security control.
•

H2a: Privacy/security policies positively influence perceived security control

Internet users have more trust in providers’ technical abilities when they perceive that providers have invested
time, effort, and money into their Web site (Schlosser et al., 2006). However, apart from being directly
attributable to technical abilities, we believe that these investments signal to users how importantly providers
take security control. The design of Web sites is akin to the physical appearance of retail products, which is a
signal of quality that is universally recognized across cultures (Dawar & Parker, 1994). Furthermore, a prior
study on Web site latency also found that slow Web site performance suggests to users that such sites might
have higher security risks (Bouch, Kuchinsky, & Bhatti, 2000). Perceived Web site investment, then, should be a
default-independent signal of security quality because the upfront costs of good Web site design and
development cannot be recouped if users shun the Web site for fear of security breaches. Such cost–benefit
analysis of opportunism ultimately leads to calculation-based trust wherein “it is not worthwhile for the other
party to engage in opportunistic behavior” (Gefen et al., 2003, p. 64). Hence, we hypothesize that perceived
Web site investments are a signal of security control to users.
•

H2b: Perceived Web site investments positively influence perceived security control.

Signals of quality stem not only from specific services but also from information about providers (Duncan &
Moriarty, 1998). We looked at how the broader corporate-level reputation of providers might also signal
security control to users. Reputation, which increases consumers’ trust in providers (Ganesan, 1994; Grazioli &
Jarvenpaa, 2000), is a cognitive source of trust based on secondhand information and stereotypes (Gefen et al.,
2003). As a source of information on providers, reputation is also universally interpreted as a signal of quality
because it not only shows strong past performance by providers but also suggests that providers have not

routinely engaged in deceptive behavior (Dawar & Parker, 1994; Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). Reputation should
be a default-contingent signal because service providers sink significant resources into developing good
reputations that they do not want to lose because of false quality claims (Rao et al., 1999). We hypothesize that
the overarching information about providers that reputation provides should also be a strong signal of security
control because reputation captures information about past security breaches and abuses.
•

H2c: Reputation positively influences perceived security control.

Building Trust

As mentioned earlier, security control artifacts are not strongly related to trust, especially when compared to
well-known trust-building factors such as reputation and Web site quality (Belanger et al., 2002; Bart et al.,
2005). In contrast, prior studies have demonstrated that perceived security control is strongly related to trust
(Suh & Han, 2003; Cheung & Lee, 2006), but this relationship has not been tested alongside other important
trust-building factors. Therefore, past research does not tell us the relative importance of perceived security
control vis-à-vis other possible trust-building factors.
We assert that perceived security control has powerful influence on trust because its antecedents capture
security-related information from all five sources of trust. Therefore, perceived security control should,
theoretically, create a very strong sense of trust. The six antecedents of perceived security control mentioned in
this study encapsulate many of the specific characteristics of users, traits of providers, and artifacts of online
services that prior literature suggests should influence trust (Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2000; Bart et al.,
2005; Schlosser et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2008). We believe, instead, that these six factors are antecedent to
perceived security control because they primarily inform users of how secure online services are. We
hypothesize that perceived security control should strongly affect trust even when its six antecedent factors are
controlled for.
•

H3: Perceived security control positively influences trust in online service providers, even when userrelated, provider-related, and service-related characteristics are controlled for.

As mentioned, prior literature has traditionally taken an alternative view of security assurance compared to that
of our proposed model. Security-related studies in IS often suggest that the factors we consider to be
antecedents of perceived security control in our proposed model should instead be directly related to trust
(Schlosser et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2008). Therefore, we also constructed an alternative model that omits the
perceived security control construct and instead predicts that the three predisposition constructs and the three
security signals will directly predict trust. Both our proposed and alternative models were subject to an empirical
study for further analysis.

EMPIRICAL STUDY
Survey Instrument Development and Deployment

The subjects of our empirical study were Internet users who engage in online retailing. We developed and
deployed a Web-based survey instrument to collect data for an empirical analysis of our hypotheses. A panel of
potential respondents received invitations to complete our survey. We found measurement items in prior
literature pertaining to the major constructs of our study and reworded them appropriately for our setting.

Online retail setting

We chose to examine the market of online retail Web sites in our empirical study for several reasons. First,
Internet users frequently engage in online shopping: a study from the Pew Institute in 2008 found that twothirds of American adults use the Internet to buy products (Horrigan, 2008). The widespread use of the Internet

as a retail channel suggests that our survey is applicable to the majority of invited respondents, thus reducing
selection bias and enhancing the variance of users’ predispositions and personal characteristics.
At the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked to list up to three retail Web sites from which they had
made a purchase before. The subject Web site for each respondent was randomly picked from the list of three
Web sites that they provided. We allowed for a variety of online stores so the respondent pool would consider a
wide variety of security signals and security implementations. We also allowed respondents to use retail Web
sites familiar to them because our study focuses on continuing trust rather than initial trust (Gefen et al., 2003).

Measurement items

A list of our survey items and their sources is provided in the Appendix. We gathered multi-item measures for
our major constructs from well-validated measures found in prior literature. Where necessary, we modified
questions to enhance clarity and to match our setting, taking care to maintain the original intent of these
questions. Items from past literature that had ambiguous meanings and did not add to the meaning of their
constructs were dropped. Responses to these multi-item constructs were measured on 7-point Likert scales with
a neutral response in the middle of the scale.
A new construct measuring perceptions of privacy and security policy was developed that included items
acknowledging the clear presence of privacy or security policies on the retailer's Web site as well as the
respondent's perceived depth of understanding of these policies. Single-item measures, modeled after similar
measures seen frequently in the literature, were used to measure respondents’ familiarity with a retailer's Web
site and to collect demographic information on age, gender, household income, and level of experience with the
Internet.

Survey deployment and data collection

The survey instrument was made available online and a marketing research firm sent e-mail invitations to a
panel of potential respondents. A total of 3,500 invitations were sent out, and the survey was kept online for
four days. A total of 601 invitees, or 17.17% of those invited, responded to the survey.
We judged the usability of responses on several criteria. Respondents were dropped from further analysis if they
did not adequately identify a retail Web site of interest or if they completed less than three-quarters of the
survey. Similarly, we dropped responses completed in less than six minutes because we felt they were rushed,
given the length of the total survey. We were left with 405 usable responses, yielding an 11.57% effective
response rate. On average, respondents were 62% likely to be female, were 47 years old, and completed the
survey within 15–16 minutes.

Measurement Model
We gathered measurement quality criteria at the same time as structural results using partial least squares (PLS)
modeling. Using PLS allowed us to accurately measure three formative constructs in our model. Failure to
appropriately model formative measurement “severely biases structural parameter estimates and can lead to
inappropriate conclusions” (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003, p. 216). PLS also reported measurement
criteria for our remaining constructs that allowed us to determine the reliability of our reflective measurement
items and the validity of our reflective constructs. All PLS models in this study were constructed and tested using
SmartPLS v2.0.M3.

Construct measurement

The PLS representation of our proposed conceptual model required the construction of both reflective and
formative constructs, and a second-order construct. Most of the major constructs were measured reflectively
with multiple items. There were several constructs, however, that were not reflective in nature. The constructs

for privacy/security policies and trust were formatively defined by weighted measures because these two
constructs were multifaceted and measured by nonequivalent items (Jarvis et al., 2003; Petter, Straub, & Rai,
2007). We measured users’ perceptions of privacy/security policies by assessing each respondent's awareness of
a privacy or security policy at his or her given retail Web site, as well as users’ depth of familiarity with these
policies. We measured trust using nonequivalent measures of perceived competence, integrity, and
benevolence of each respondent’s chosen retail Web site.
Perceived security control was both a second-order construct and formative in nature. Security control was
defined by five subfactors: authentication control, nonrepudiation control, privacy control, confidentiality
control, and data-integrity control. These five subcomponents were formative factors of security control
because they do not necessarily covary with one another. Furthermore, the subcomponents were themselves
formatively defined by their corresponding measurement items, which contributed unique meanings to their
proper subcomponent. Consequently, it was appropriate to model the second-order security control construct
using all 18 measurement items of its subcomponents as formative indicators (Petter et al., 2007).

Measurement quality

The results of running the PLS model helped establish the reliability of our measurement items and the validity
of our constructs. Reliability was determined from the outer loadings of the reflective factors. Items with
loadings of less than 0.70 have more error variance than variance shared with their respective constructs
(Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995). One item of Internet privacy concern with a loading below the 0.70
threshold was discovered, and an item of vendor reputation also came very close to this threshold (with a
loading of 0.72). Both items were dropped from further consideration because they did not add any unique
meaning to their respective constructs. The PLS model was reevaluated and all items of reflective constructs
were found to be highly reliable with loadings well above 0.80.
We determined the overall reliability of our reflective constructs from their composite reliability and average
variance extracted (AVE). Table 2 reports composite reliability, AVE, and correlations of our reflective constructs.
All reflective constructs demonstrated internal consistency with composite reliability greater than 0.70, and AVE
greater than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).
Table 2. Measurement quality and correlations.
Mean SD
AVE
CR
FML

INN

IPC

INV

PSP

REP

SEC

TRUST

FML
5.61
1.68 n/a n.a
n/a 1.00
INN
4.43
1.60 0.85 0.92 0.94 0.38 1.00
IPC
5.36
1.53 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.39 0.31 1.00
INV
5.66
1.24 0.80 0.89 0.92 0.46 0.32 0.35 1.00
PSP
5.54
1.46 n/a n.a
n/a 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.44 1.00
REP
6.12
1.28 0.82 0.90 0.93 0.53 0.28 0.28 0.59 0.46 1.00
SEC
5.44
1.11 n/a n.a
n/a 0.50 0.36 0.31 0.64 0.57 0.61 1.00
TRUST 5.48
1.36 n/a n.a
n/a 0.46 0.26 0.21 0.51 0.42 0.62 0.70 1.00
Note: SD: standard deviation; AVE: average variance extracted; CR: composite reliability; FML: familiarity; INN:
technical innovativeness; IPC: internet privacy concern; INV: Web site investments; PSP: privacy/security
policies; REP: reputation; SEC: Perceived security control; TRUST: trust in vendor.
Finally, the discriminant validity of our constructs was tested in two ways. First, we compared item-loadings of
reflective and formative factors with cross-loadings to confirm that no item loaded better upon another
construct than it did upon its designated construct. Second, we sought to compare the variance that reflective
constructs shared with their items to the variance they shared with other constructs (Barclay et al., 1995). The

square roots of the AVE of the reflective constructs were all significantly larger than the correlations between
constructs, indicating that constructs had more in common with their own respective item-measures than they
did with each other.

Structural Analysis

The proposed model (Figure 1) hypothesized that various predispositions influence perceived security control
(H1), various security signals influence perceived security control (H2), and the overall perception of security
control influences trust even when predispositions and signals are controlled for (H3). The hypothesized paths of
our proposed model were tested with the structural results reported from running the PLS model. The statistical
significance of structural paths was determined by a bootstrap procedure that generated and used 300
subsamples. Table 3 reports all structural path estimates and their significances.
Table 3. Structural results of proposed and alternative models.
Proposed Model
Alternative Model TRUST
SEC
TRUST
R2
0.57
0.56
0.45
Security signals
Website investments
0.36 ***
−0.01
0.17 **
Privacy/security policies
0.26 ***
−0.02
0.11
Reputation
0.23 ***
0.30 *** 0.43 ***
Predispositions
Familiarity
0.10
0.07
012
Technical innovativeness 0.05
−0.01
0.02
Internet privacy concern
−0.05
−0.06
−0.08
Security control
Perceived security control
0.52 **
Controls
Age
0.00
0.04
0.05
Gender
−0.06
−0.02
−0.04
Household income
0.02
−0.02
−0.02
Internet experience
−0.10 **
0.02
−0.03
Note: SEC: perceived security control; TRUST: trust in vendor.
**p < .01; ****p < .001.
The results of our PLS analysis showed no support for either part of hypothesis H1, with none of the
predispositions having any significant influence on perceived security control. However, both parts of H2 were
fully supported with all three security signals having substantial and significant effects on perceived security
control: the effect of perceived Web site investment was 0.36 (p < .001); the effect of privacy/security policy
perceptions was 0.26 (p < .001); and the effect of vendor reputation was 0.23 (p < .001). Finally, H3 was also
supported with perceived security control having a large and significant effect (0.52, p < .001) on users’ trust in
vendors despite all six predispositions and signals acting as controls. We note that reputation had a strong
influence on trust, although none of the other controls were significantly related to trust at the same time as
perceived security control. Overall, our assertions about signaling and security control were fully supported, but
hypotheses relating to the relationship between predispositions and security control notably failed.
We also tested an alternative model that omits perceived security control and proposes that predispositions and
security signals directly predict trust. The results of testing this model are also shown in Table 3. With perceived
security control no longer present, Web site investments had a significant effect on trust (0.17, p < .05) and

reputation had a far stronger effect on trust (0.43, p < .001) than in the proposed model. However, privacy and
security policies did not significantly influence trust. Furthermore, users’ predispositions also failed to influence
trust in this alternative model. Overall, this alternative model explained considerably less of the variance in trust
(R2= 0.45) than did our proposed model (R2= 0.56), leading us to prefer our proposed model over the alternative
model.

DISCUSSION
Our results reconfirm that users form distinct perceptions of security control that strongly relate to users’ trust
in online service providers (Suh & Han, 2003). In addition, this study contributes to our knowledge about
security perceptions by showing that security control should be viewed as a credence quality that users can
perceive based on a mix of nontechnical cues. The security signals in our study show that trust formation for
services with credence qualities might be very different from what we know about search and experience
qualities of IS. The results of our alternative model also show that it is important to consider perceived security
control when discussing security assurance.

Theoretical Implications

The strong antecedent role of security signals helps resolve the question of whether security signals directly
relate to users’ trust of online services or whether signals inform users of security quality instead (Larose &
Rifon, 2006; Schlosser et al., 2006). Our results contribute to this debate by showing that security signals are a
strong determinant of users’ security perceptions, which, in turn, increases trust. The results of our proposed
model, compared to those of the alternative model, suggest that perceived security control fully mediates the
signaling effects of Web site investments and policy documents, and partially mediates the effects of reputation.
Consequently, researchers should prefer using perceived security control as a more parsimonious and powerful
way of capturing security-related issues leading to trust.
Researchers should also note that security signals encompass the full gamut of signal types considered in the
marketing literature, from corporate-level signals to default-contingent and default-independent marketinglevel signals. We note, however, that although the signals sent by privacy and security policies had a strong and
significant effect on perceived security control, these policy artifacts did not directly influence trust in either our
proposed or alternative models. Without the mediating presence of a perceived security control construct, our
results might incorrectly suggest that policy documents do not have any bearing on security assurance or trust.
Therefore, we recommend that studies on the efficacy of security signals and artifacts examine effects on both
perceived security control and trust, rather than on trust alone.
Interestingly, personality-based predispositions in our model did not significantly influence perceptions of
security control. This finding suggests that security-related perceptions and behaviors of long-time users might
not be related to their personal characteristics. Therefore, studies on security assurance may largely disregard
personal preferences relating to risk-taking and privacy when security signals are accounted for. However,
further research is required to determine whether there are personal characteristics other than the ones we
used that might influence users’ perceptions of online security control.
Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution of this study is that it integrates signaling theory from
economics and marketing with theory on trust formation developed in IS (McKnight et al., 1998; Gefen et al.,
2003). Together, the six antecedents of perceived security control proposed by our model represent the various
major categories of signals as well as the major sources of trust in online services. Our results show that
perceived security control is largely influenced by security signals that correspond to the institutional,
calculative, and cognitive origins of trust. This mapping appears to partly conflict with trust theory, which argues
that cognitive sources of trust such as reputation are important in initial stages of service adoption but become

immaterial in ongoing relationships (Gefen et al., 2003). Although first-hand knowledge-based information
acquired from familiarity is expected to be more important in ongoing relationships, we found that reputation
had a very significant relationship with perceived security control whereas familiarity had no significant effect on
perceived security control.
We agree with prior research that, ordinarily, reputation should not play a significant role in ongoing
relationships where familiarity should be more important. However, we start by noting that prior studies have
not consistently found evidence of the influence of familiarity across contexts (Gefen et al., 2003; Bart et al.,
2005). We believe that the credence-quality nature of security prohibits users from fully relying on knowledgebased information, such as familiarity, because they cannot ascertain security quality even after prolonged use
of online services. Instead, users must stay cognizant of third-party information, such as reputation, that could
reveal new information about a provider's security control and trustworthiness under security risk. Therefore,
although our findings regarding reputation and familiarity are at odds with conventional trust theory in IS, they
might reflect the true nature of credence qualities of online services.
We submit that security control, as a credence quality, leaves users in a gray area where they must perpetually
rely on a combination of sources of trust that correspond to both initial and ongoing relationships. As a result,
researchers must simultaneously apply both initial and ongoing models of trust when dealing with security
issues of online services. Further research is needed to determine whether the same combination of signaling
effects from institutional, calculative, and cognitive sources of trust, and noneffects from personality and
knowledge-based sources, applies to other credence qualities of online services.

Managerial Implications

Given the substantial resources spent complying with security standards, it greatly benefits information
technology managers to be able to show a return on these investments in the form of increased trust and
patronage. This study helps to show that users’ perceptions of security control appears to be a stronger
determinant of trust than many previously researched factors, such as reputation (Schlosser et al., 2006).
Therefore, this study serves as a call to researchers and practitioners to refocus on security assurance and to
develop strategies for influencing users’ perceptions of security control.
A major finding of this study relating to security–assurance strategy is the strong effect that security signals have
on perceived security controls. Our results show that security signals can come from both corporate and
marketing levels and that the credibility of these signals can be either contingent on or independent of potential
default on claims. Hence, a concerted management effort is needed to coordinate efforts to signal security from
high-level announcements down to Web site design and choice of interface artifacts. In this regard, we found it
particularly interesting that perceived Web site investments had a relatively stronger relationship with perceived
security control than did any other class of signals, including reputation. This finding bodes well for small
businesses and startups who might not enjoy the same market-wide reputation or security-related resources of
larger firms, but who can still invest effort in designing attractive and effective client interfaces.
The lack of influence of personality-based sources of trust, such as predispositions and familiarity, on perceived
security control suggests that security signals should not be targeted on a limited segment of users. Instead,
online service managers should deliver their signaling efforts to their entire user base. However, considering the
important influence of reputation on both perceived security control and trust, we suggest that managers could
start with users who are more likely to spread positive word-of-mouth and help maintain reputation.
Although we urge managers to leverage opportunities to signal security control, we caution that security signals
are not always under managerial control. The structural paths in our model from reputation and Web site
investment to perceived security control suggest that unexpected changes in the market or lapses in service

availability might have an adverse influence on perceived switching costs because of changes in perceived
reputation and perceived Web site investment. Therefore, researchers and managers should continuously
educate users about security implementation to foster a more accurate and objective appreciation of security
control that is more robust in dealing with unrelated lapses or market changes.

Limitations
We believe that our findings offer a direction for future studies on security assurance. However, researchers
should take caution in interpreting our results. Our study makes several assumptions that need to be further
scrutinized in future research. First, although we suggest causal relationships between many of our key
constructs, we note that our cross-sectional data-collection approach shows only correlation. In particular, we
note that the relationship between perceived security control and trust needs further investigation before we
can conclude that perceived security control is a contributor to trust.
We also note that our constructs of perceived security control and Internet privacy concern treat privacy and
security as interchangeable concepts. We have chosen to use these constructs because they have been
validated in past research and are found in the literature. Although we believe that privacy and security are
distinct but related issues, we believe that our approach makes our findings relevant to prior research.
Regardless, our findings need to be verified in future research that examines security and privacy separately.
Another issue is that although we found no significant effects from the personal predispositions included in our
study, we cannot be certain whether other personality-related factors might be relevant to security. Our chosen
set of personality-related factors covers general risk-related preconceptions regarding privacy, general riskseeking predispositions reflected in technological innovativeness, and personal experience with specific
providers. Although we feel these predispositions are broad in nature and highly relevant to security beliefs, we
do not claim that they are an exhaustive set of user characteristics.
Finally, we note that our empirical test considered a single quality attribute of online services in the context of a
single industry: security control at online retail services. We believe that our findings are generalizable regarding
security in online consumer–provider settings because we did not constrain our respondents to any subset of
online stores or services. However, we recognize that security control could be perceived differently in
intraorganizational, business-to-business, or online community contexts where users take part in service
provision. Furthermore, although we believe that many of our findings might be true for credence qualities
other than security, further research is required on the relatively underexplored area of credence qualities.

CONCLUSION
The security control efforts put in place by online service providers do not provide effective security assurance
because security control is essentially an unobservable quality for users. Consequently, service providers will
always face an uphill battle to gain users’ trust when security risks are present. This study offers a first glimpse
into the factors contributing to users’ perceptions of security control and how these perceptions are distinct
from but related to trust. The results of the study offer insights that can help online service providers better
manage these perceptions by taking advantage of security-related signals that offer users more interpretable
cues of security control. Importantly, although this study examined users in ongoing relationships with online
service providers, it showed that users’ beliefs about security control arise from a mixture of factors that are
attributed to both initial and ongoing relationships. This finding shines light on the mixed characteristics of
perceived security control in particular and possibly of credence qualities in general.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY MEASUREMENT ITEMS
Unless otherwise noted, all items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to
‘Strongly Agree’ with a ‘Neutral’ option in the middle.
Users’ Predispositions and Familiarity
Technical Innovativeness—based on Agarwal and Prasad (1998)
If I heard about a new information technology, I would look for ways to experiment with it.
Among my peers, I am usually the first to explore new information technologies.
I like to experiment with new information technologies.
Internet Privacy Concern—based on Smith et al. (1996) and Malhotra et al. (2004)
Compared with other subjects on my mind, online privacy/security is very important.
I am concerned about threats to online privacy/security today.
Familiarity with Web Site
How familiar were you with the retail website before being asked to review it for today's survey?
(7-point scale anchored on ‘Not at all familiar’—‘Neutral’—‘Very familiar’)
Perceived Security Signals
Privacy/Security Statements
The availability of a privacy or a security statement was easily seen on the website.
This retail website has a policy on privacy or security.
I am aware of the details of this website's privacy or security policy.
Web Site Investment—adapted from Schlosser et al. (2006)
A lot of time seems to have been invested in developing this website.
A lot of effort seems to have been invested in developing this website.
A lot of money seems to have been invested in developing this website.
Reputation—based on Jarvenpaa et al. (2000)
This company is well known.
This company has a good reputation.
This company has a good reputation in its market.
Trusting in Retail Web Site—based on Morgan and Hunt (1994)
The retail website can be trusted at all times.
The retail website can be counted on to do what is right.
The retail website has high integrity.
The retail website is competent and knowledgeable.
Perceived Security Control—Suh and Han (2003)
Perceived Authentication Control
The transactions I send are transmitted to the real site to which I want to transmit.
The messages I receive are transmitted from the real site from which I want to receive.
This site ascertains my identity before sending any messages to me.
This site ascertains my identity before processing the transactions received from me.
Perceived Nonrepudiation Control
This site provides me with some evidence to protect against its denial of having participated in a
transaction after processing it.
This site provides me with some evidence to protect against its denial of having sent a message.
This site provides me with some evidence to protect against its denial of having received a
transaction from me.
Perceived Privacy Control
This site never sells my personal information in their computer databases to other companies.
This site devotes time and effort to preventing unauthorized access to my personal information.
Databases that contain my personal information are protected from unauthorized access.

I can remove my personal information from this site when I want to.
Perceived Confidentiality Control
All communications with this site are restricted to the site and me.
I am convinced that this site respects the confidentiality of the transactions received from me.
This site uses some security controls for the confidentiality of the transactions received from me.
This site checks all communications between the site and me for protection from wiretapping or
eavesdropping.
Perceived Data Integrity Control
This site checks the information communicated with me for accuracy.
This site takes steps to make sure that the information in transit is not deleted.
This site devotes time and effort to verify the accuracy of the information in transit.
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